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Dialectics and the Austrian School:
A Surprising Commonality in the Methodology of
Heterodox Economics? [1]
Andy Denis
Abstract: This paper is prompted by the concluding comments to a recent paper
(Denis “Hypostatisation”), which suggests that the neoclassical use of the concept
of equilibrium expresses a formal mode of thought. Heterodox tendencies from
Marxian to Austrian and Post Keynesian economics, that paper continues,
exemplify a dialectical mode of thought in their common rejection of neoclassical
equilibrium theorising. Heterodox currents in economics are – particularly in
terms of their analysis and policy prescription – often as divided amongst
themselves as they are from the orthodoxy. Nevertheless, the present paper suggests,
there may be something profound uniting these disparate heterodox trends: the
adoption of a dialectical method. The paper draws on the work of Sciabarra
(“Marx”, “Total”), who argues that Marxian and Austrian economics are
intellectual cousins sharing a methodological approach. He suggests that making
process primary, which we might expect of Austrian economists, is the essence of
dialectics, which we might identify with Marxism. If that is the case, then
perhaps (a) we can only understand the method of neoclassical economics by
contrasting it with a dialectical approach, and (b) we can explore methodological
common ground between the various heterodox currents by examining their
attitude, both implicit and explicit, to dialectics. Pluralism in economics requires,
not merely toleration – though indeed it does require that – but mutual
engagement, a conversation. For that to take place we need an understanding of
what divides and unites the various approaches. This paper is offered as a
contribution to the development of that mutual understanding.
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Introduction
It has been claimed (Sciabarra “Marx” – henceforth MHU; and Sciabarra “Total”
– henceforth TF[2]) that the Austrian school of thought in economics is
characterised, and importantly so, by a dialectical methodology, and hence shares
a common heritage with Marxism. This message has not been an easy one to
digest. Nevertheless, criticism has been eclipsed by praise, mostly emanating from
libertarian currents, and by scholarly discussion, in which his stance has been
taken very seriously by libertarians, and, in particular, by Austrian economists.
This is evidenced by the reviews his book has received (extensively documented on
his web pages, Sciabarra nd), and the online seminar on the topic of his book
which was held on the Hayek-L list in 2001 (HAYEK-L). In apparently
convergent vein, at the end of a recent paper on the misuse of the concept of
equilibrium by the neoclassical school (Denis “Hypostatisation”), the suggestion is
made, that what many heterodox economists from widely differing schools had in
common, and what clearly divided them all from the formalism of the mainstream
orthodoxy, was an implicitly dialectical approach. The present paper takes this
idea further by examining Sciabarra’s contention of a dialectical methodology
underlying both pro-market and market-sceptical heterodox schools of thought in
economics, and addresses the question whether this can really be so.
MHU is a methodological comparison of Marx and Hayek, with core chapters on
‘Hayekian Dialectics’ and ‘Marxian Dialectics’. TF consists of two halves, the first
about the history and meaning of dialectics, and the second a case study of an
eminent Austrian economist, Murray Rothbard. Other Austrian economists are
also referred to in TF – the index entries for Hayek and Mises being particularly
lengthy and detailed. This paper will first examine Sciabarra’s understanding and
presentation of dialectics and then consider his application of the notion to
Austrian economists, focusing on Hayek. In brief, my judgements are that (a)
though Sciabarra is no Marxist, his work constitutes an honest, sympathetic,
insightful and informative account of Marx; (b) Sciabarra’s notion of dialectics is
a profound and thoughtful attempt to get to grips with what he (and the present
writer) take to be a, perhaps the, key methodological issue for economics; (c)
Sciabarra makes a compelling case for an implicitly dialectical methodology on
the part of leading Austrian economists; (d) Sciabarra’s work constitutes a
challenge to the undialectical methodological underpinnings of the neoclassical
orthodoxy, and provides the basis for an enlarged conversation between, not just
Marxist and Austrian economics, but also other components of the heterodoxy,
such as the Post Keynesian school of thought. The development of pluralism in
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economics requires, not merely toleration – though indeed it does require that –
but mutual engagement, a conversation between the various schools of thought
that comprise the discipline. Sciabarra’s work constitutes a contribution to our
understanding of what divides and what unites the various approaches to
economics which that conversation requires.
Dialectics
This section, and the next, looks at Sciabarra’s understanding and presentation of
the dialectical approach. Here I will set out the main points of Sciabarra’s
presentation, indicating the breadth and depth of his approach. The following
section will comment on some problematic aspects of his understanding of
dialectics, the principle issue being Sciabarra’s stance on the law of
noncontradiction and the status of contradictions in a dialectical standpoint.
What does Sciabarra mean by dialectics? His answer is contained in the following
core definitions, one from MHU and one from TF:
“dialectics requires the examination of the whole both systemically (or
‘synchronically’) and historically (or ‘diachronically’). From a synchronic
perspective, it grasps the parts as systemically interrelated, both constituting the
whole, while being constituted by it. Diachronically, dialectics grasps that any
system emerges over time, that it has past, a present, and a future. It refuses to
disconnect factors, events, problems, and issues from each other or from the system
which they jointly constitute ... the dialectical thinker seeks not merely to critically
understand the system, but to alter it fundamentally.” (MHU: 5)
“Dialectics is an orientation toward contextual analysis of the systemic and
dynamic relations of components within a totality. A totality is ... a specific whole
as understood from – and structured by – shifting perspectives … [D]ialectics is a
thinking style that stresses the centrality of context in the analysis – and alteration
– of social systems across time. It offers a formal structure of analytical tools that
enable us to undertake a systematic course of action to achieve a particular goal,
namely, the correct understanding and transformation of reality. In a dialectical
approach, the aspects of a totality are understood systematically – that is, according
to their spatial, or synchronic, interconnections – and dynamically – that is,
according to their temporal, or diachronic, interconnections. This is the leitmotif
of dialectical inquiry: the grasping of the object by a study of its interrelated
aspects, situated within a specifically defined system and understood over time,
inclusive of past, present, and possible future manifestations.” (TF: 173) [3]
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These are interesting and challenging definitions with much to welcome: an
orientation which focuses on ‘contextual analysis of the systemic and dynamic
relations of components within a totality’, ‘a totality ... understood from ... shifting
perspectives’, ‘the understanding and transformation of reality’, and the centrality
of time. These elements should all (with the partial exception of the
transformation of reality, perhaps) gladden the hearts of Hegelians, Austrians and
Marxists, systems thinkers and post Keynesians alike.
Further definitions, emphasising now one, now another of these many facets of his
core definition, may be found scattered throughout MHU and TF: “dialectics is a
way of thinking. A dialectical perspective ... focuses not on external relations
between static elements, but on dynamic internal relations. These relations
constitute and are constituted by the elements of the whole under scrutiny” (MHU:
23). “Dialectics restructures our thinking about reality by replacing the common
sense notion of ‘thing,’ as something that has a history and has external
connections with other things, with notions of ‘process,’ which contains its history
and possible futures, and ‘relation,’ which contains as part of what it is its ties
with other relations” (MHU: 25). “The thread that runs through all its various
incarnations [sc incarnations of dialectics] has been the importance of context,
perspective, systemic integration, and dynamic process” (TF: 142).
An important point arises in the section entitled ‘Unpacking the Definition’ in
Chapter 4 of TF, ‘Defining Dialectics’. “Ollman (1993) remarks that a dialectical
sensibility begins with the ‘real concrete’, that is, ‘the world as it presents itself to
us.’ It aims for a ‘thought concrete,’ in which the mind reconstitutes the whole as a
totality, that is, as an ‘organic’ or structured unity of multidimensional relations
of varying degrees of complexity ... this movement from the ‘real concrete’ to the
‘thought concrete’ is not possible without the process of abstraction” (TF: 179). In
pointing up this insight of Ollman’s, Sciabarra is restating Marx’s view that “The
concrete is concrete because it is the concentration of many determinations, hence
unity of the diverse ... the method of rising from the abstract to the concrete is
only the way in which thought appropriates the concrete, reproduces it as the
concrete in the mind” (Marx, “Grundrisse” 101).
Sciabarra is well aware that the process of abstraction, which plays a critical role
in appropriating the really concrete as ideally concrete, is a two-way process, that
it is a process with analytical and synthetic moments: “The process of abstraction
is a process of boundary-drawing ... In drawing the boundaries that define our
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analytical units, we are not simply abstracting parts of a whole. The units
themselves are relations ... The process of abstraction ... requires a concomitant
process of integration. One cannot abstract without integration, and one cannot
integrate without abstraction.” (TF: 179-181) To separate the two, Sciabarra
suggests, is to engage in reification. The concept of reification is an important
theme in his work. At one point he identifies it with fetishisation (TF: 125), and
this is significant, for the notion of reification that he identifies forms the basis
of the Marxist theory of fetishisation and alienation. Although Sciabarra has not
himself quite reached that concept, he has set out the basis for it. It is therefore
worth looking at this theme in Sciabarra in a little more detail.
The notion of context is absolutely central to Sciabarra’s concept of dialectics, and
recurs on virtually every page. The most relevant dictionary definition of context
is “the whole structure of a connected passage regarded in its bearing upon any of
the parts which constitute it” (OED). By extension we clearly may apply the
concept not just to literary passages, but to the world or any part of it understood
as a connected whole. Sciabarra refers approvingly (TF: 178) to the word’s
etymological origin in the Latin for ‘weaving together’ the strands of a fabric. In
spelling out the meaning of context for his definition of dialectics, Sciabarra
immediately links it to the question of reification: “the concept of ‘context’ ... is an
assertion of the analytical integrity of the whole and a warning against the
reification of parts as wholes unto themselves” (TF: 178). We will find, however,
that two distinct errors are being included under this rubric.
In his chapter on Hegel (TF: 73), Sciabarra approvingly cites Hegel on the need to
make distinctions, but to integrate them in the whole of which they are part:
“these determinations become ‘the sphere of difference, of dualism, the field of
finitude,’ as Hegel puts it when they are abstracted as entirely separate from other
determinations and the wider context within which they subsist. Hegel objects to
this ‘dualism’, for it places ‘insuperable opposition’ between spheres that are
mutually implied. In such cases, the process of abstraction, which is a necessary
step in any analysis, reifies the objects of study, and the resulting ‘dualism is a
half-truth.” It may sound odd to refer to the ‘reification’ of the ‘objects of study’,
since to reify means ‘to make into a thing’, and presumably the objects of study are
already things. The term fetishisation might have been preferable. The point
which Hegel and Sciabarra are getting at is that the thing is made independent of
its systemic and dynamic context: its moments of coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be
(its origin and decease), its moments of relation, of transition into and mutual
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implication of its others, are all left out of account and obscured. This is one
meaning of reification.
The second meaning emerges in Sciabarra’s treatment of Menger, his explication
of Menger as a dialectical thinker:
“In praising the ‘organic orientation of social research,’ Menger seeks an
integration of micro and macro approaches. The former, disparagingly called
‘atomistic,’ can never ‘deny the unity of organisms.’ Menger aims to investigate the
complex origins and functions of ‘real unities.’ His micro-level analysis is not
opposed to the organic orientation; it is opposed to ... seek[ing] explanation in a
reified ‘common will’.” (TF: 121)
Whereas the first meaning of reification was the non-temporary isolation of
moments, of parts from the whole, the second, what Menger opposes at the micro
level, is the ascription of reality and force to unreal aggregate level abstractions.
Now, of course, it is an empirical question, whether or not a particular
macro-level entity has reality and force: the body of an animal certainly has
reality vis-à-vis the individual cells, tissues, organs, etc, and markets, states, firms
and trade unions all have powers to impose some and prohibit other actions of
their individual members. I am not commenting here on the content of Menger’s
propositions, but his method. What Menger is perfectly reasonably objecting to, is
the ascription of a false material reality and efficacy to imaginary macro-level
entities, such as, in his example, the “common will”. Another example would be
the Absolute Idea in Hegel: both Hegel and Marx regarded the attribution of
reality and force to ideas which were logically prior to the material world as
idealism – though, of course, that label is for Hegel very far from the refutation it
is for Marx. By setting out these two sides of the concept of reification, Sciabarra
establishes the basis for the development of Marx’s theory of fetishisation, which
unites them. This is best seen in Marx’s “Critique of Hegel’s Doctrine of the State”
(Marx, “Early” 57-198), and Colletti’s insightful essay introducing it (Colletti).
According to Marx (Denis, “Marx”), each of these sides implies the other. Marx in
turn criticises Hegel’s method, the modern state, and, later capital itself, as a
double process of hypostatisation. Setting aside the real, empirical world, and
positing instead the self-movement of a disembodied Geist as the active principle
of the world, constitutes the hypostatisation of the self-movement of the world –
what Marx refers to as ‘crass idealism’ (“Early” 385). This is what Sciabarra in his
discussion of Menger refers to as the reification of unreal unities, and in his
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discussion of Mises as the latter’s ‘opposition to the reification of the collective’
(TF: 125). The attempt then to deduce from that Geist all the particular
circumstances of the world, which were therefore simply restored, reintroduced,
but not mastered in thought, Marx regards as the inevitable result of this
hypostatisation, an ‘equally crass materialism’ (“Early” 174). The result is material
objects divorced from their relationships with their real temporal and systemic
context and presented as end products of a metaphysical process. Thus the
analytical integrity of the real whole is denied, and the parts are reified as
self-subsistent wholes. In sum, Marx claims that Hegel’s method reproduces
exactly what Hegel was complaining about in the first place. The two notions of
reification present in Sciabarra therefore need to be thought through and brought
into relation with each other.
The last point to be made here on Sciabarra’s construal of the dialectical approach
concerns the temporal aspect: the recognition that time, history, transition,
dynamics are of the essence. Drawing once again on the work of his teacher,
Bertell Ollman, Sciabarra insists that
“One of the principles of dialectics is that in any analysis of any object of inquiry –
be it an entity, event, issue, or problem, – our understanding of that object must
include a focus on dynamics. How an object comes to be what it is, which forms it
currently takes, and where it might be tending are all a part of its identity” (TF:
141).
The dynamic aspect of the dialectical method is precisely what distinguishes the
Austrian school from the neoclassical orthodoxy:
“some economists in the Austrian tradition hold that process is one of the most
important aspects of any analysis. Rizzo (1996a xv) argues, for example, that in the
neoclassical “static conception of time, the present is a virtual stop – the very
negation of passage or flow”” (TF: 184).
And it is precisely here that we can find a convergence of approach between
Austrians, such as Rizzo, and Marxists, such as Norman, Trotsky and Ollman:
“Norman (in Norman and Sayers [1980] 1994, 30) argues correctly that ‘[w]e cannot
construct change and motion out of static elements.’ Our analysis must begin with
the fact of change, from which we can abstract and inquire into particular
moments. Dialectics, says Trotsky (1942, 51), embraces a view of things akin to a
‘motion picture,’ rather than ‘a still photograph.’ Ollman (1993) too criticizes
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mainstream social science, in which things are said to ‘exist and undergo change.’ It
is as if these two aspects are ‘logically distinct.’ The historical dimension is
‘something that happens to things,’ rather than something that is part of the nature
of things. Mainstream social science attempts to analyze change among things from
which process itself has been abstracted. By contrast, a dialectical perspective
stresses that ‘whatever something is becoming ... is in some important respects part
of what it is, along with what it once was’” (TF: 183-184).
Sciabarra’s dialectics: some criticisms
The approach taken here is not to assert apodictically that Sciabarra is wrong, or
to expose his error and hence presumed moral failing to the world. Rather the
objective is to engage with his contribution and look for ways forward – in a spirit
of pluralism and openness – towards claiming and cultivating the common ground
which the present writer believes he has uncovered. In that spirit the following
criticisms of Sciabarra’s account are tentatively raised.
Firstly, we should note that ‘totality’ is described as ‘a specific whole as understood
from – and structured by – shifting perspectives’. This seems to privilege
externality. In a truly dialectical approach, the ‘whole’ is understood as something
in the world which has an internal dialectical structure containing contradictions
which drive it forward over time. But for Sciabarra, the ‘whole’ seems not to be
about the world, but our understanding of it, it’s about epistemology, not ontology.
‘A totality is ... structured by [our] ... perspectives’ (TF: 173). He defines ‘totality’
later in these terms: “A ‘totality’ is a model of the whole as a structured unity, once
the relations of its subsidiary parts been well investigated, abstracted, and
integrated for a specifiable analytical purpose that brings forth coherent
explanation” (TF: 176). The totality is thus not something out there which we seek
to understand, but an idea, a model, in our mind which results from the effort to
understand the world. There is no indication that this mental model corresponds
to anything objective. ‘Dialectics is a thinking style’ he says, ‘Dialectics is an
orientation’: not ‘dialectics is the thinking style and orientation which we are
obliged to adopt by the dialectical and contradictory nature of the world we live
in’.
This alarm bell rings louder when we look at Sciabarra’s standpoint on the issue
of the law of noncontradiction.
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The three laws of formal logic are
“(1) law of contradiction – something cannot exist and not exist at the same
time;
(2) law of excluded middle – something either exists or it does not, no middle
condition is possible;
(3) law of identity – something is always identical with itself” (EB).
All of these laws are violated by dialectics. Take the example of a beginning, the
instance Hegel himself refers to in the Introduction to the Science of Logic (Sol: §
110). When we consider the beginning of something, the thing both
(a) is, and
(b) is not.
Both (a) and (b) are true, since if (a) only were true, then the thing would have
already begun, and if (b) only were true, it would not yet have begun.
Law (1) is violated by the fact that the thing both exists and does not exist;
Law (2) is violated in that the beginning is, exactly, the middle term between the
thing simply not existing (before its beginning), and simply existing (thereafter);
and
Law (3) is violated as the thing is not always identical with itself, but changing,
in contradiction to itself, moving forward from one moment to another, from
non-being to being. What it is at one moment is not what it is at another: it is in
transition.
The only way that the three laws can be applied is to freeze time[4]. At one
instant in time, taking the logical limit as we consider an ever shorter interval,
then all three laws are valid, and there are no contradictions. But that is an
abstraction – useful, no doubt, but not a representation of reality. This is the
essence of dialectics: the point on which Marx and Hegel are united. The opposite
is to say, with Kant, that contradictions are not of the essence, but something
apparent, not something which exists in the world, but an error or inadequacy or
pathology in the way we perceive the world. Dialectics is not an alternative to
(formal) logic, both are valid when applied correctly. But dialecticians are
opposed to the hypostatisation of logic, making a timeless abstraction into reality,
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replacing its transience with permanence. To do so is to mistake an abstraction for
a description of reality.
Unfortunately, Sciabarra doesn’t see things quite this way. His standpoint begins
to emerge in his consideration of Aristotle (TF: Chapter 1). Aristotle, he says,
enunciates the law of noncontradiction as both an ontological and a logical axiom.
He cites Aristotle as saying that
“the most certain principle of all is that regarding which it is impossible to be
mistaken … It is, that the same attribute cannot at the same time belong and not
belong to the same subject in the same respect … this [is] an ultimate belief; for
this is naturally the starting point even for all the other axioms” (Aristotle, cited in
TF: 30-31).
Significantly (as it seems), Aristotle says that we must hold fast to this axiom ‘in
face of dialectical objections’. As we have seen, the law of noncontradiction applies
only in the absence of time: it is true for (formal) logic, but it cannot be true of
the world, ontologically true, for any ontology which includes time. Aristotle thus
seems, in the passage cited by Sciabarra, regardless of the stance he takes
elsewhere, to side explicitly with formal logic against dialectic.
Yet Sciabarra immediately claims that “Aristotle exhibits … an awareness of
dialectical thinking” and “does not fixate on a static tautology with laws that deny
the process of becoming”. No justification for this judgement is adduced, save that
“when Aristotle tells us that A cannot be A and not-A, he adds: at the same time
and in the same sense” – a caveat which scarcely seems to take us further forward.
Trotsky, in a passage which Sciabarra (TF: 85) takes issue with, and which
discusses the relation between formal logic and dialectics, gets the matter exactly
right. He has been showing that A is not necessarily equal to A, as nothing is ever
exactly equal to anything else, even itself:
“A sophist will respond that a pound of sugar is equal to itself ‘at any given
moment.’ Aside from the extremely dubious practical value of this ‘axiom,’ it does
not withstand theoretical criticism either ... everything exists in time; and existence
itself is an uninterrupted process of transformation ... Thus the axiom A is equal to
A signifies that a thing is equal to itself if it does not change, that is, if it does not
exist ... To make use of the axiom A is equal to A with impunity is possible only
within certain limits. When quantitative changes in A are negligible for the task at
hand then we can presume that A is equal to A.” (Trotsky 49).
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Sciabarra says that “Trotsky (1942: 49) and Novack … are quick to deny the
axiomatic character of identity, suggesting that Marx’s dialectic ‘supersedes’ or
‘overthrows’ the ‘static tautologies’ of Aristotelian logic”. But Trotsky isn’t denying
the validity of Aristotelian logic, merely pointing out the limits to the context
within which it can be applied. What he is passionately opposed to is any idea
that the Aristotelian logical categories describe reality – on the contrary, they
describe a static, timeless world. In different words, Trotsky is not rejecting
formal logic in limine, but subjecting it to immanent critique. Sciabarra has read
this passage, and, indeed, with some sympathy – he later quotes from the same
piece in support of his own view (TF: 183). To be a consistent dialectician, as he
aspires, he should, in my view, take Trotsky’s point here, too. What stops him is
his desire to apply the law of noncontradiction, not just to the abstract world of
mathematics and formal logic, but – as an axiom, and not as an approximation –
in reality as well.
Sciabarra claims (TF: 31) that ‘the whole thrust of the Aristotelian metaphysic is
toward process and movement’. No. It is the case that Aristotle is regarded by
many dialecticians, including Hegel and Marx, as the fountainhead of dialectics.
But his work, like Hegel’s own, is itself deeply contradictory, and his reputation
for formality and undialectical thought is also not entirely undeserved. In the
specific passages which Sciabarra is discussing, it is the anti-dialectical Aristotle
who is at work: “movement does not deny the law of noncontradiction … when we
come upon a paradox, Aristotle implores us to recognise that contradictions cannot
exist. It is incumbent on us … to change our context … in order to resolve the
puzzle.” (TF: 31-32) This clearly adopts the standpoint that formal logic represents
the world, and that contradictions are paradoxes and puzzles for us, because of our
limited perspective. It constitutes a hypostatisation as it takes an abstraction and
substitutes it for reality. The world obeys the law of noncontradiction, according to
Aristotle and Sciabarra, there are no contradictions in it, and if we think we see
one, we have to change our way of looking at it, until the puzzle is resolved.
Again, what Hegel says in the Science of Logic is relevant here:
“formal thinking lays down for its principle that contradiction is unthinkable: but
as a matter of fact the thinking of contradiction is the essential moment of the
Notion. Formal thinking does in fact think contradiction, only it at once looks
away from it” (SoL: § 1799).
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When formal logicians assert that the law of non-contradiction is true of the
world, they are expressing fear of the chaos which results in a formal system when
contradictions creep in: in a formal system, as soon as a single contradictory
statement is allowed, contamination immediately infects the entire system – every
possible statement and its contrary can now be proved, and the system is unable to
discriminate between true and false statements. The fear is that once we allow
contradiction to enter our understanding of the world, we will be incapable of
discriminating true and false statements about the world. But the world is not a
formal system, and dialectic is not the same as anarchy, since – in the view of
dialecticians such as Marx and Hegel – contradictions and the transitions they
induce are themselves lawful.
The term ‘immanent critique’ was used above. ‘Immanent critique’ and ‘immanent
criticism’ are also terms used by Sciabarra and Hayek. According to Sciabarra,
“Aristotle uses this technique in virtually every branch of the philosophical
sciences … It is what Bhaskar (1994, 8) has described as a ‘method of immanent
critique’.” (TF: 32-33) It is a misunderstanding to style the approach that
Sciabarra is promoting here, with reference to Aristotle, ‘immanent critique’. This
is an external (or transcendent) approach, not an immanent one, as the dialectic
within the thing is denied: the thing is made to adhere to a formal logic within
which there can be no contradictions. The dialectic, progress through
contradictions, is something for the observer only, not the thing observed, and here
we see the link with the external, subjective character of Sciabarra’s concept of
context, which we noted earlier. Again, Hegel (in the Smaller Logic) disagrees:
“Philosophical thought … only accepts its object … and while allowing it its own
way, is only, as it were, an onlooker at its movement and development. To this
extent philosophizing is wholly passive … there is required an effort to keep back
the incessant impertinence of our own fancies” (Hegel, “Encyclopaedia” 294, § 238).
Immanent critique thus ‘allows its object its own way’, and the critic is only an
onlooker at the movement and development of the object – his task is primarily to
keep his own prejudices at bay and prevent them from intruding.
Hayek, too, has trouble with the concept of immanent criticism. Hayek (“Law”
volume 2 24) says:
“If we are to make full use of all the experience which has been transmitted only in
the form of traditional rules, all criticism and efforts at improvement of particular
rules must proceed within a framework of given values which for the purpose in
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hand must be accepted as not requiring justification. We shall call ‘immanent
criticism’ this sort of criticism that moves within a system of rules and judges
particular rules in terms of their consistency or compatibility with all other
recognized rules in inducing the formation of a certain kind of order of actions.”
Hayek’s first sentence here, it seems to me, says that reform of specific rules may
be permissible, but the overall framework, for example, laissez-faire capitalism,
has to be treated as ‘not requiring justification’. And the second says that this
acritical procedure, where you decide externally what the result of your study is
going to be before you start, is to be known as ‘immanent criticism’. If we have a
particular kind of society – laissez-faire capitalism, slavery, patriarchy, Stalinism,
monarchy, etc – then, as Hayek points out, all the rules of society will articulate
together to underpin and reproduce that system. If you wish to preserve the system,
then, of course, you need to ensure that changes in rules are such as to enable the
modified rule to continue to articulate with all the other rules – the ‘framework of
given values’ has to be accepted. But this presumes that you wish to preserve the
system rather than change it for another one. Is it the case that if we live under
feudalism, we have to ensure that any reforms are consistent with feudalism, or do
we say that it is the reform that counts, and if feudalism is incompatible with it,
then so much the worse for feudalism?
Returning to Sciabarra’s treatment of the law of noncontradiction, confirmation
that Sciabarra has adopted the Kantian approach arises when he considers Kant
and Hegel. “Kant recognized that … contradictory claims seem to coexist despite
the fact that it is impossible for both A and not-A to be true at the same time and
in the same respect … Kant seeks to preserve the Aristotelian law of
noncontradiction” (TF: 55). Ayn Rand “was violently opposed to Hegel for his
‘philosophical crimes’ … she saw Hegel as second only to Plato for having
produced ‘the greatest intellectual harm to mankind, with the most disastrous
practical consequences’” (TF: 60). And what was it that Rand (and Popper, too)
objected to in Hegel? The one factor that Sciabarra specifically mentions is that
they regarded his dialectic as ‘an affront to the law of noncontradiction’ (TF: 61).
Coming to Hegel, Sciabarra dedicates a section, entitled “To be or not to be a
contradiction” (TF: 68 –71), to the issue of contradiction and noncontradiction in
Hegel. “[D]oes Hegel endorse the reality of living contradictions, sweeping aside
the norms of thought and the laws of logic, or does his notion, in some sense, lie
outside the so-called static presuppositions of formal logic?” (TF: 68) The answer,
of course, is both! Hegel does endorse the reality of contradictions, full stop. Does
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that ‘sweep aside[5] the laws of logic’? Yes, the laws of (formal) logic are put aside
in dialectics, as soon as we start to deal with internal dynamic and systemic
relations, that is, with context.
Sciabarra wants to preserve both formal logic and dialectics. And he is right. But
he has to get their articulation right. They are each correct in their own rightful
context. There is no symmetry: just as, in the case of the finite and the infinite, in
Hegel, it is the infinite that absorbs the finite, here it is the dialectical which
absorbs the formal. The world is dialectical – it is characterised by complex
mutable structure – systemic organic interrelationships evolving through time.
Formal logic looks at snap-shots and allows us to make non-trivial and
counter-intuitive inferences about the world; inferences whose approximate
validity extends in space and over time to the extent that the ceteris paribus
conditions – the things which are held absolutely fast in the snap-shot – are
approximately true in the world. It depends on a fiction, an approximation, an
idealisation, just as calculus assumes that two points sufficiently close together on
a curve may be assumed to lie on a straight line. The assumption of slow change is
taken to the limit and infinitely slow change assumed. As soon as temporal or
systemic relatedness is allowed, the spell is broken and the three laws crumble.
Hayekian dialectics?
This section will attempt to summarise Sciabarra’s argument that Hayek’s work is
based in a dialectical approach to the problem of establishing a non-reductive
social science.
Standing back from the detail of his account, Sciabarra notes the common roots of
the Austrian and Marxist standpoints in the Aristotelian, classical German
philosophical and Scottish Enlightenment traditions. This he links immediately
with their dynamism and opposition to the static equilibrium of the neoclassical
orthodoxy, and their rejection of its narrow disciplinary boundaries:
“Austrians and Marxists have always had a unique ability to raise similar,
fundamental questions. Both schools of thought have been intellectually influenced
by the constellation of Aristotelian, German, and Scottish traditions. Both share
the view that social reality is a dynamic process constituted by human action. Both
criticize mainstream, static, equilibrium-based economic analysis. Both refuse to
separate the economic sphere from the organic social whole of which it is a part.”
(MHU: 92)
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Sciabarra is not saying that Hayek ever explicitly claimed to use, or even
consciously realised that he was adopting, a dialectical approach. So how can he
be a dialectician? “[D]ialectics is indispensable to the reasoning mind. Dialectics
is ... an aspect of reasoning ... it is possible to find manifestations of [dialectical
faculties of mind] even among nondialectical thinkers, insofar as they think at
all” (TF: 186). Sciabarra cites Trotsky (84) “Every individual is a dialectician to
some extent or other, in most cases, unconsciously.” So on what grounds can
Sciabarra claim a significant dialectical moment to Hayek’s thought?
Essentially, Sciabarra’s argument is that Hayek has a dialectical approach
exemplified in his understanding of the organic relationships between individuals
which constitute the society within which they are embedded and which determine
the meaning of what they do: “As employed by both Marx and Hayek, the
dialectical method preserves the analytical integrity and organic unity of the
whole ... it eschews reification, that is, it avoids the abstraction of a part from the
whole and its illegitimate conceptualisation as whole unto itself. The dialectical
method recognises that what is separable in thought is not separable in reality”
(MHU: 4). “An organic unity resides in the whole, Hayek suggests, but the whole
is not an aggregation of ‘single observable things.’ It consists of ‘structures of
relationships’ understood through the lens of theory. These structures are
‘persistent’ and lend themselves to an organic analogy” (TF: 130).
To illustrate, Sciabarra quotes from Hayek’s Sensory Order: “As in the biological
organisms we often observe in spontaneous social formations that the parts move
as if their purpose were the preservation of the wholes ... In the social sphere these
spontaneous movements ... preserve a certain structural connection between the
parts” (Hayek, cited in TF: 130). He might well have quoted a passage which sets
out the theoretical status of the individual in Hayek’s approach: “The individuals
are merely the foci in the network of relationships” (“Counter-Revolution” 59).
This is a world away from the conception of neoclassicals such as Milton
Friedman, who holds that economics is the study of “a collection of Robinson
Crusoes” (13).
In a section of MHU provocatively entitled ‘Hayek versus “Methodological
Individualism” (MHU: Chapter 1 “Hayekian Dialectics”, 15-20), Sciabarra
identifies the key issue thus: “‘methodological individualism’ ... has often been
identified with atomism, reductionism, and ahistoricism. It is said to see the
whole as the mere sum of its parts. It views the individual – or the part – as of
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primary epistemological importance, and structures the whole through an additive
analytical process” (MHU: 16-17). This is of course exactly what the orthodoxy
does; Denis (“Rhetorical”) compared the methodological reductionism of such
neoclassicals as Friedman and Lucas with the methodological holism of Hayek
and Smith. Sciabarra defends Hayek against the charge of atomism: he is
individualistic but not atomistic – he is as ‘interested in grasping the whole’ as
holism is. “It is a distortion to view Hayek’s approach as either individualistic or
holistic. Hayek’s method is fundamentally dialectical, encompassing elements of
individualism and holism ... detailed examination of Hayek’s mode of inquiry
suggests that [he] was highly dialectical in many significant ways” (MHU: 17).
“Throughout Hayek’s writings, there is a crucial emphasis on the importance of
historical and systemic context, on the complex, evolving, organic unity of the
social world. This understanding ... forms the core of a sophisticated,
nonreductionistic method of social inquiry. Both Hayek and Popper argue against
reductionism in the social sciences since society is more than the mere sum of its
parts. Reductionism relies on a ‘historical myth,’ in Popper’s view, because it sees
human beings as somehow ‘presocial.’ As Popper argues, ‘man’s’ ancestors were
‘social prior to being human ... Men are if anything the product of life in society
rather than its creators.’ ... Hayek recognises the ontological priority of concrete
particulars, of real, existing individuals ... Hayek sees the ‘individual,’ ‘reason,’
‘morality,’ and ‘culture’ as emergent qualities of social evolution. He maintains that
there is no concept of the ‘individual’ that is not tied to a historical and socially
specific structure. [He sees] an intricate reciprocity between the parts and the
whole”. (MHU: 17-18)
While these comments are enough to give a flavour of Sciabarra’s account of the
element of organicism in Hayek, I think it worth setting out in more detail what
it is, in the standpoint adopted in this paper, that is specifically dialectical about
Hayek’s standpoint.
Firstly, Hayek’s account displays the unity of opposites: each part of an organic
unity presupposes the others, each is implicit in the others, none has meaning
outside the context of all the other parts. Secondly, there is space in Hayek’s
account of society for dialectical reversals. The micro is the basis and substrate for
the macro, but the macro is emergent and is different, sometimes the opposite of
the lower level. Think, for example of the complex relations between the system of
rules of individual conduct and the order of actions of a group of individuals in
‘Notes on the Evolution of Systems of Rules of Conduct’ (Hayek, “Studies” Ch 4,
66-81):
Denis, Andy (2008) ‘Dialectics and the Austrian School: A Surprising Commonality in the
Methodology of Heterodox Economics?’, The Journal of Philosophical Economics, I:2, 151-173
“The overall order of actions in a group is ... more than the totality of regularities
observable in the actions of the individuals and cannot be wholly reduced to them
... a whole is more than the mere sum of its parts but presupposes also that these
elements are related to each other in a particular manner” (“Studies” 70). “Not every
system of rules of individual conduct will produce an overall order of the actions of
a group of individuals ... and it is at least conceivable that the same overall order of
actions may be produced by different sets of rules of individual conduct ... The
same set of rules of individual conduct may in some circumstances bring about a
certain order of actions, but not do so in different external circumstances.”
(“Studies” 67-68)
Here Hayek suggests that a system of rules of individual conduct at the micro
level may or may not underpin a sustainable macro-level order of the actions of
the group of individuals. If it does, then the order it does elicit will depend on
context, and knowing the order which has arisen does not necessarily tell you the
system of rules that underpins it – there is no one-to-one relationship.
Thirdly, Hayek’s account makes salient the issues of process and time: to see
society as an organism raises questions of its embryology, its evolution, and its
metabolism. Over time, as well as between levels, society is susceptible to
transformation. Fourthly, there is a reversal of causation, a top-down causation or
teleology: the behaviour of the individual is a product of the evolutionary history
of the society to which the individual belongs.
There is thus considerable justification for Sciabarra’s approach, identifying
Hayek’s approach as dialectical on the grounds of his organicism. The link
between the organic and the dialectical are profound. It was, in fact, just because
Hegel saw the world as an organism that he was able to develop the dialectic of
his Logic, and it was precisely that feature of Hegel’s account of society that drew
Marx’s admiration: “It is a great step forward [for Hegel] to have seen that the
political state is an organism” (Marx, “Early” 66).
Conclusions
The aim in reviewing Sciabarra’s work here has been, firstly, to highlight common
ground and areas of agreement, and, secondly, to show points or areas where
Sciabarra’s conception and presentation of dialectics can perhaps be strengthened,
where the logic of his own position, once clarified, will be seen to point towards
new understandings.
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There is much in Sciabarra which can productively be developed and extended.
The most obvious direction for research here is the case of Keynes. Sciabarra has
argued that the Austrian economists are – largely unconsciously – dialecticians.
On similar grounds to those cited by Sciabarra, one could, it seems, erect a
formidable argument that the General Theory exemplifies a profoundly dialectical
standpoint and method. As argued elsewhere (Denis, “Keynes” Section III ‘Keynes
and holism’, 196-200), Keynes adopts a ‘holistic’ or organicist standpoint in the
General Theory, in opposition to the ‘reductionism’ of what he called the ‘classical’
school. Sciabarra’s principal point about Hayek’s methodology is that his
‘organicism’ (what the present writer prefers to refer to as holism), is an implicitly
dialectical orientation, and its counterpart, ‘atomism’ (reductionism, in the present
writer’s terminology), tantamount to the rejection of dialectics.
The first instance Denis (“Keynes” 196) gives of Keynes’s ‘holism’ – or dialectics –
concerns his adoption of Marx’s formulae for the circulation of commodities, C –
M – C’, and of capital, M – C – M’ (Keynes, “Supplement” 89). The first says that a
commodity or use-value is sold in order to buy another commodity: the difference
between C and C’ is qualitative. The second says that money is exchanged for
commodities in order to sell commodities and acquire more money: the difference
between M and M’ is quantitative. Keynes points out that the former is the
standpoint of the private consumer, and the latter that of business. Here we have
an instance of the shifting perspectives or context that Sciabarra rightly makes
central to dialectical thinking. We also have implicit acknowledgment that the
emergence of capitalism from simpler, more use-value oriented modes of
production involves a dialectical reversal and a transformation of quality into
quantity.
The ‘standpoint of business’, the structure of incentives under capitalism, involves
contradictions, in Keynes’s view: although we might behave as though production
were carried out for its own sake, this cannot literally be true. Repeatedly in the
General Theory (GT: 104, 106, 211) Keynes makes the point that consumption is
the sole end and aim of economic activity. The point Keynes is making (Denis,
“Keynes” 197) is that production has to be validated by consumption to count as
production: output must be sold to convert it back into money, and, indeed, more
money than was started with. The subordination of ends to means, of consumption
to production implicit in classical laissez-faire capitalism sets up a continually
re-emerging barrier to accumulation in the form of under-consumption and
failures of aggregate demand. Thus implicitly Keynes’s method is one which fits
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well with Sciabarra’s definition of dialectics: “an orientation towards contextual
analysis of the systemic and dynamic relations of components within a totality”
(TF: 173). It also fits the definition of dialectics indicated in the present paper as
identifying contradictions in the world and allowing our concepts to reflect their
evolution.
Keynes’s methodological standpoint is summarised when he stands back from the
detail of his work three years after the publication of GT, and identifies the
differentiae of his approach in the following terms:
“I have called my theory a general theory. I mean by this that I am chiefly
concerned with the behaviour of the economic system as a whole .... And I argue
that important mistakes have been made through extending to the system as a
whole conclusions which have been correctly arrived at in respect of a part of it
taken in isolation.” (GT: xxxii – this is from the preface to the 1939 French edition
of GT.)
Keynes sets out very clearly here what he takes to be the distinguishing feature of
two approaches: on the one hand, that we can derive correct conclusions from the
study of microeconomic phenomena ‘taken in isolation’, but that to extend those
conclusions to macroeconomic phenomena leads to error, and, on the other hand,
that the correct approach to macro is what many would now call a systems
approach, aiming to examine the behaviour of ‘the economic system as a whole’.
This is precisely what Sciabarra and I have identified as a dialectical articulation
of the micro with the macro.
Keynes’s methodological insights continue to inform the post Keynesian movement
today:
“Modelling the economy as a representative agent rules out by assumption one of
the fundamental insights of Keynes (and Marx), to wit, the fallacy of composition,
that what may be true of the individual taken in isolation is not necessarily true of
all individuals taken together. This implies that when looking at the
macroeconomic processes at work in capitalism, we cannot presume that the whole
is but the sum of the parts. Indeed it is not.” (Harcourt)
Later in the same paper, Harcourt welcomes “Marx’s analysis of the inherent
contradictions in capitalism”. A recent paper by Chick and Caserta on ‘provisional
equilibrium’, which they oppose to static neoclassical equilibrium theorizing,
concludes that
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“When equilibrium is conceived as provisional in nature it is easy to see that
change need not be the result of an exogenous shock, but rather may emerge quite
naturally from within the larger system ... a system [can] be in equilibrium at one
level and disequilibrium at another and contain contradictions which are the
source of change ... [such] systems ... [are] open, historical, causal systems ... Change
can be seen as the manifestation of what was previously hidden ... It is as if
something eventually comes to the surface after having travelled under water for
some time ... change is always the manifestation of what was previously hidden.”
(Chick and Caserta)
The dialectical tendency of this conclusion could scarcely be clearer.
The conclusion to be drawn, therefore, is that Sciabarra has opened up an
opportunity for a fruitful exploration of methodological common ground between
Marxist and Austrian economists, but that we cannot stop there, and the next task
is to investigate the dialectical underpinnings of the Keynesian tradition. There is
much to be done, and the cause of pluralism in economics can only benefit from it.
Abbreviations
EB Encyclopædia Britannica (nd)
GT Keynes (1973)
MHU Sciabarra (1995)
OED The Oxford English Dictionary (OED Online)
SoL Hegel (nd) Hegel’s Science of Logic
TF Sciabarra (2005)
Endnotes
[1] Written while Visiting Research Fellow at CPNSS, LSE, and on sabbatical
leave from City University, London. I would like to thank Meade McCloughan,
seminar participants at Nottingham Trent University, and participants at the
AHE annual conference, City University, London, July 2005, for comments. With
special thanks to Mary Denis.
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[2] A list of abbreviations is given at the end of the paper.
[3] All emphases as in the original.
[4] A related point applies to extension in space, as the boundary between two
things is where they both are and are not. To keep things manageable, however,
the present account focuses on time.
[5] Note that he says ‘sweep aside’ not ‘sweep away’. Elsewhere (TF: 64-65)
Sciabarra suggests that the notoriously difficult Hegelian term sublation
(aufheben) is well translated by ‘putting aside’, as the thing which is aufgehoben
is both annulled and preserved. It seems to imply a more determinate negation.
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